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This study tests the accounting quality during booms and bust phases of 
business cycles along with the impact of financial regulations such as the 
Regulation of Fair Disclosure (2000) and the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002). 
Using a cohort of 677 firms with constant data of 18 years (12186 firm annual 
years) from US 1500 Index for the period 1993-2010, this study uses more 
robust econometrics approaches such as Arelanno-Bond generalized method of 
moments (GMM) and system GMM in addition to Panel least square, Fixed 
Effects, and Random Effects models. This study finds that business cycles 
affect accounting quality and firms do more earnings management during 
expansion phases as compared to contraction phases of economic business 
cycles. Also, this study shows positive impact of the regulations on accounting 
quality. This study contributes to accounting literature through analysis of 
accounting quality metric, discretionary accruals based earnings management 
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CHAPTER I
___________INTRODUCTION________
The concept of accounting quality has attracted significant attention of 
investors, regulators and researchers recently in the wake of major corporate 
scandals in the United States (US) such as Enron, WorldCom and HealthSouth. 
In an efficient capital market, stock prices adjust to new information. 
Information imperfections can impact stock prices and price discovery. The 
quality of accounting information (or accounting quality) is one such 
information which can impact stock prices and price discovery. Accounting 
quality is the precision with which financial reports convey information to 
investors about the firms expected cash flows (Dechow, Ge and Schrand 2010).
Earnings management is one of the reasons for poor accounting quality. 
Less earnings management is considered as one of the criteria of better 
accounting quality. Earnings management is managers’ judgment which they 
use in “financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend 
on reported accounting numbers” (Healy and Wahlen, 1999, p. 368).
There is no unanimous definition available in accounting literature of 
what constitutes accounting quality (Verleun et al. 2011). It is also an elusive 
concept because of multiple uses of financial statements (Chen et al. 2010).
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However, the users of accounting information understand the notion of 
accounting quality, though their perceptions might be different (Eugene, 1988). 
The main purpose behind the accounting quality is improved reliability; 
transparency and uniformity of financial reporting process (Waroonkun and 
Ussawanitchakit, 2011). Consequently, earnings quality can meet the primary 
objective of financial reporting that provides the useful information to 
investors, creditors and other users to evaluate the firm’s cash flow prospects 
(Entwistle and Phillips, 2003). In brief, accounting quality is that whether the 
financial reports reflect the underlying economic situation (Chen et al. 2010). 
To know the underlying economic situation, accounting quality can be defined 
in the terms of less earnings management, more timely loss recognition and 
more value relevance (Lang, Raedy, and Yetman,. 2003, Lang, Raedy, and 
Wilson, 2006, Barth, Landsman, and Lang, 2008, and Chen et al. 2010).
Higher Accounting quality not only increases investors’ confidence in 
financial reporting but also helps enhance the firm’s reputation in the capital 
market. Capital market participants can make sound decisions on the basis of 
quality information disseminated by companies’ financial statements. Higher 
accounting quality also helps companies achieve higher level of corporate 
stability and survival (Waroonkun and Ussahwanitchakit, 2011). Conversely, 
poor accounting quality is economically expensive and associated with less 
timely price adjustment and a higher cost of equity (Callen, Khan, and Lu, 
2012).
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One of the measures to improve accounting quality is the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act (SOX), passed in US on July 30, 2002. This act introduced the 
significant legislative changes in financial practices and corporate governance 
regulations for the further prevention of accounting scandals in US. The SOX 
directs organizations to improve accuracy and reliability of corporate 
disclosure and thus protecting the interests of investors. In particular, SOX 
helps improve corporate governance and deters managers’ opportunistic 
behavior (Hossain et al. 2011). The other is the Regulation of Fair Disclosure 
(RFD), passed in 2000. The main aim of RFD was to reduce information 
differences between individual and market participants and also to prohibit 
selective disclosure of material information (Bailey et al. 2003; Eleswarapu, 
Thompson, and Venkataratnan, 2004). These regulations provide auditors a 
more consistent and precise framework to evaluate the financial statements of 
firms, which in turn benefit all stakeholders.
Similar efforts are made in the European Union (EU) which passed a 
regulation in 2002. As of 2005 all publicly listed companies in EU are required 
to comply with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
(Soderstorm and Sun, 2007 and Barth, Landsman, and Lang et al. 2008). The 
International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) and the International 
Accounting Standard Committee (IASC) have issued principles-based 
standards and limited accounting alternatives to improve accounting quality. 
Basically, the main notion is to better reflect a firm’s economic position and 
performance.
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As per existing literature, a few studies have been done in this area to 
track the impact of these regulations. The main focus is on financial regulations 
that are supposed to be associated with higher accounting quality. The studies 
are: an analysis of accounting quality between cross-listed firms on US 
Exchange and non-cross listed firms (Lang, Ready, and Yetman, 2003), a 
comparison of accounting quality between International Accounting Standards 
accepted firms (IAS firms) and Non- International Standards accepted firms 
(Non-IAS firms) (Barth, Landsman, and Lang,. 2008) and a examination of 
accounting quality before and after Sarbanes Oxley Act (Verleun et al. 2011).
The main aim of financial regulations previously passed is to make sure 
that financial reports provide fair information on timely basis with its value 
relevance. Only these regulations cannot improve accounting quality, unless all 
the factors that motivate firms’ managers to adjust accounting numbers are 
identified. Researchers find that accounting quality affect the investment-cash 
flow sensitivities for firms that issue either public or bank debt (Beatty, Liao, 
and Weber, 2010), stock price, and future stock returns (Callen, Khan, and Lu, 
2011). In short, accounting quality influences investors (capital market) and 
other users. Therefore, it becomes significant to explore all possible factors that 
can affect the quality of accounting information.
Some of the theories related to earnings management (poor accounting 
quality) are “Bonus Schemes” (Healy 1985), “Import Relief’ (Jones, 1991), 
“Earnings Surprises” (Rajgopal et al. 2007), and “Initial Public Offerings”. 
However, there is a further need to identify all other possible reasons that can
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lead to lower accounting quality. In the light of these factors, it might be bit 
easier for regulators to set accounting standards that really can help enhance 
the accounting quality. One of the undiscovered factors which can affect firms’ 
accounting quality is ‘business cycles’. Business cycles include expansion and 
contraction periods that can be causes of the higher or lower accounting 
quality. During expansion, economy goes up and, down during contraction 
period. The following section presents the research objectives.
Research Objectives of Thesis
This study aims to contribute to the existing literature of accounting 
quality by addressing the following research questions:
1. What are the characteristics of accounting quality?
2. What are the effects of poor/good accounting quality?
3. What are the different metrics used to measure accounting quality?
4. Whether business cycles (expansion and contraction periods) affect the 
accounting quality or not?
The next section provides a detailed roadmap of the organization of the
thesis.
Organization of Thesis
The objective of this study is to reveal the effects of business cycles, 
expansion and contraction periods on accounting quality in addition to 
financial regulations; the Regulation of Fair Disclosure (2000) and the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002). In doing so, the research provides detailed 
information about the literature related to the concept of accounting quality and 
research done in this area. The second chapter reviews the literature and
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develops hypotheses. Chapter 3 presents the data and methodology used in 
empirical investigation. Chapter 4 provides empirical results. Finally, chapter 
5 presents the conclusions.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE RE VIEW AND 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
This chapter reviews the literature on accounting quality and states the 
hypotheses for empirical verification. This chapter is divided into three 
sections. Section 1 discusses about accounting quality and its characteristics. 
Section 2 shed light on the effects of accounting quality. Section 3 discusses 
the accounting quality measures existed in accounting quality literature. 
Section 4 proceeds with hypotheses building and related literature.
2.1 Accounting Quality and its characteristics
Accounting quality plays an important role in firm’s valuation (Gaio 
and Raposo, 2011). It is not only of interest to users of financial statements but 
also practitioners, regulators, and academics. Accounting quality is widely 
discussed in the literature and has economic consequences such as cost of 
capital (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000); efficiency of capital allocation (Sun 2006; 
Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith, 2011) and international capital mobility 
(Young and Guenther, 2002). The International Accounting Standard Board 
(IASB) has created a conceptual framework which includes qualitative 
characteristics of good financial reporting. The elements of conceptual 
framework consist of timeliness, neutrality and comparability (Francis, Olsson 
and Schipper, 2006). Good accounting quality is associated with reliability 
(neutrality) and relevancy (timeliness) of financial statements along with
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comparability. Hulzen et al., (2011) also apply these characteristics (except 
comparability) to examine the effect of the two methods of estimation of 
goodwill (for e.g. amortization and impairment) on accounting quality.
There is no unanimous definition in literature on what constitutes 
accounting quality (Schipper and Vincent, 2003; Verleun et al. 2011). 
Researchers have defined accounting quality as per their research agendas. 
Waroonkun and Ussahwanitchakit (2011) define accounting quality as the 
combination of four dimensions: (i) accounting standard compliance, (ii) 
regulation related accounting practices, (iii) best accounting method concerns 
(the judgments by managements to select accounting policy), and (iv) public 
expectation mind set (building of public trust). The presence of these 
dimensions is supposed to lead to financial report efficiency, information 
valuables, and accounting performance.
Most studies related to accounting quality relate to its market impacts 
(Francis, Olsson, and Schipper, 2006; Barth, Landsman, and Lang, 2008; 
Dechow, Ge and Schrand 2010; Chen, Jiang, and Lin, 2010; and Callen, Khan, 
and Lu, 2012). Accounting quality is the potential of accounting measures to 
better reflect the firm’s true economic position and performance (Barth, 
Landsman, and Lang, 2008). There are several other definitions available in 
accounting literature. Some of the researchers consider ‘persistent earnings’ as 
of higher quality earnings, but some others relate higher quality earnings to 
accurate representation of economic implications of underlying transactions
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and events (McNichols, 2002).1 Consistent with latter, accounting quality is the 
precision with which financial reports convey information to investors about 
the firms expected cash flows (Dechow, Ge and Schrand 2010). This definition 
relates to the capital markets perspective of earnings quality.
Dechow and Dichev (2002) relate earnings quality to ‘the magnitude of 
estimation errors’ in accruals.2 They also define earnings quality as the 
relationship between accruals and cash flows (McNichols, 2002).3 Researchers 
(for e.g. Dechow and Dichev, 2002; McNichols, 2002; Francis et al. 2004, 
2005; Kim and Qi, 2010; and Garcia-Terul et al. 2010) associate accruals 
quality with accounting quality. Large accruals signify low earnings quality 
and less persistent earnings (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). Dechow and Dichev 
assume high persistent earnings as higher accounting quality. However, recent 
research considers it (persistent earnings or earnings smoothing) as lower 
accounting quality.4
One important and related concept of earnings quality is earnings 
management.5 Earnings management interests those who are concerned with
1 ‘Persistent earnings’ is one of the measures of earnings quality and is viewed as more
2 Estimation error is the difference between the amount accrued and the amount realized 
(McNichols, 2002). The notion of estimation errors includes both intentional and unintentional 
errors (Dechow and Dichev, 2002).
3 Accruals accounting is one of two approaches (other is cash based accounting) used to 
provide economically meaningful information beyond cash transactions (Gibbins, 2007). 
Under this approach revenues and expenses are recorded when earned and incurred 
accordingly, regardless cash is received or paid. Estimates, adjustments, judgments are made to 
make financial statements more meaningful. Researchers calculate accruals by subtracting cash 
flows from net income (Barth, Landsman, and Lang, 2008). Accruals can be calculated by 
widely used Jones or Jones modified models for research purposes.
4 Earnings smoothing is one of the two (other is managing towards a target) forms o f 
earnings management (Barth, Landsman, and Lang, 2008). It is generally defined as the 
smoothing of reported earnings over time (Ronen and Yaari, 2007, p.317).
5 The terms ‘earnings quality’ and ‘accounting quality ‘are used interchangeably in 
accounting literature
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accounting quality (Francis, Olsson and Schipper, 2006). It is considered as a 
main characteristic of accounting quality. It is a purposeful intervention in 
external financial reporting process with the intent of obtaining some private 
gain (Schipper, 1989). Less earnings management evidence higher accounting 
quality and vice versa. In addition to less earnings management, researchers 
such as Lang, Raedy, and Yetman (2003); Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2006); 
and Barth, Landsman, and Lang, (2008); characterize higher accounting 
quality in the terms of more timely loss recognition, and higher value relevance 
of earnings and equity book value.
2.2 Accounting Quality and its effects
Researchers demonstrate the impact of accounting quality on firms’ 
reputation and their survival level. Similarly, they also exam its impact on 
stock prices and future stock returns. Better accounting quality can reduce 
information asymmetry costs and financial constraints (Beatty and Liao, 2010). 
The weight of empirical evidence points to a statistically significant and 
economically meaningful association between accounting quality and expected 
returns (and abnormal returns) i.e. realized returns (Francis, Olsson and 
Schipper, 2006).
Empirical studies relate higher accounting quality to lower agency cost, 
lower cost of capital (Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker, 2003; 2012; Francis et 
al. 2004; 2005), and higher investment efficiency (Biddle and Hilary, 2006). 
Accounting quality also affects debt contracting options (Bharath, Sunder, and 
Sunder, 2008). Borrowers with poor accounting quality have to depend on
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private debt (bank loans). In addition, poor earnings quality lowers the value of 
corporate cash holdings (Sun, Young, and Rehman, 2012).6
Furthermore, accounting quality solve two purposes. First is, higher 
accounting quality (high quality information) leads to higher quality judgments 
and decisions. Second, it provides signals to participants who prepare and 
disseminate information about their performance (Francis, Olsson and 
Schipper, 2006). In fact, accounting quality (financial reporting quality) 
concerns with those who use financial reports for investment purposes and for 
contracting purposes as well as with those who set the financial reporting 
standards (Schipper and Vincent, 2003). Hence, low quality information results 
to unintended wealth transfers, capital misallocation, and loopholes in financial 
standards.
2.3 Accounting Quality Measures
Accounting quality measures can be classified as either accounting 
based or market based (Francis et al. 2004; Francis, Olsson, and Schipper, 
2006).7 Accounting based measures use accounting data whereas market based 
measures base on market data. Accounting based measures assume that ‘the 
function of earnings is to allocate cash flows to reporting periods via accruals 
whereas ‘market based accounting measures assume that the function of 
earnings is to reflect economic income as represented by stock returns’(Francis,
6 Corporate cash holdings denote to corporate cash reserves. Firms with poor accounting 
quality would hold more corporate cash with its lower value. For e.g. more cash holdings can 
create agency problems because excess cash can be easily diverted to managers’ private 
benefits or for their pet projects and investors discount the value o f cash holdings on their 
expectations that how the cash would be used. This increased agency cost can deteriorate 
firm’s value (Sun, Young, and Rehman, 2012).
7 Francis, Olsson, and Schipper, 2006 can be referred for more details on accounting quality 
metrics.
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Olsson, and Schipper, 2006).8 The remainder of this section discusses several 
measures of accounting quality used in accounting research.
2.3.1 Accruals quality.
This measure is based on the view that how well accruals map into cash 
flows realizations. Accruals quality is the standard deviation of the residuals 
from firm specific regressions of working capital accruals on last-year, current, 
and one-year-ahead cash flows from operations (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). 
High mean and low-variance firms have good accounting quality and vice 
versa (Francis, Olsson, and Schipper, 2006).
The firm specific regression is:
A WCt = b0 + b^C F O ^ + b2CFOt + b3CFOt+1 + £t (2.1)
CF0= cash flows from operations;
A WC= change in working capital;9
2.3.2 Abnormal accruals (or Discretionary accruals).
Inverse measure of earnings/accounting quality is abnormal accruals 
(Francis, Olsson, and Schipper, 2006).10 Abnormal accruals are not well 
explained by accounting fundamentals. The abnormal accruals are measured 
using Jones or modified versions of Jones (1991) model. The most widely used 
version to compute discretionary accruals is the Modified Jones model by 
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeny, (1995). However, the total accruals are estimated
sAccruals quality, persistence, predictability, and smoothness are accounting data based 
accounting quality measures. Market based measures are value relevance, timeliness, and 
conservatism (Francis, Olsson, and Schipper, 2006).
*AWC =
Accounts Receivable +  A Inventory — AAccounts payable +  ATaxes payable +
A Other assets (net). Refer Dechow and Dichev, 2002 for details.
10 Abnormal accruals captures management’s financial reporting decisions (or discretion) 
(Francis, Olsson, and Schipper, 2006).
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using the original equation used by Jones (1991).The following regression is 
run to obtain residuals in the year t  and for firm i:
TACCit = ax—-— I- a2AREVit + a3PPElt + eit (2.2)
Mt- 1
Where: TACC = Total accruals,
AREV = change in revenues lagged by total assets;
AREC = change in net receivables lagged by total assets;
PPE -  gross property, plant and equipment lagged by total assets; and 
au a2, and a3 = firm specific parameters.
The abnormal accruals are determined by subtracting non-discretionary 
(normal) accruals from total accruals. Modified Jones model works to measure 
nondiscretionary accruals. Modified Jones model calculates the 
nondiscretionary accruals using the following equation:
NDACCit = ax - 2 -  + a2(AREVit -  ARECit) + a3PPEit (2.3)
Ait-i
NDACC = nondiscretionary accruals.
2.3.3 Earnings persistence.
This measure captures earnings sustainability (Francis et al. 2004; 
Francis, Olsson, and Schipper, 2006). Followed by previous research (e.g. Lev 
1983; Ali and Zarowin, 1992), Francis et al. 2004 measures earnings 
persistence as the slope coefficient estimate, 0 ltj  ,from an autoregressive 
model of order one (AR1) for annual split-adjusted earnings per share
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(X; t measured as firm j 's  net income before extraordinary items in year t  
divided by weighted average number of outstanding shares during year t ):11 
Xj.t, =  0o j  + 0ij-^/,t-i, + vj,t• (2.4)
This equation is typically estimated in time series, firm-by-firm, using 
maximum likelihood estimation. The resulting estimates of 01>;- captures the 
firm j's  persistence of earnings. The slope coefficient value close to one 
implies high persistent earnings and close to zero implies low quality earnings.
2.3.4 Predictability.
This accounting quality measure is based on the view that an earnings 
number tends to repeat itself is of high quality. This measure is the error 
variance from equation (2.4) and estimated as:
Predictability = J cf2(Vj) (2.5)
Large/ small values imply that lower/ higher earnings/accounting
quality.
2.3.5 Smoothness.
The main notion behind this measurement is that ‘managers use their 
private information about future income to smooth out transitory fluctuations 
and thereby a more representative reported earnings number’. To the extent 
that current earnings which are more representative of future earnings are of 
higher quality, smoother earnings indicate higher earnings quality and vice 
versa.
11 Refer Francis et al. 2004; and Francis, Olsson, and Schipper, 2006 for more details on 
this measure.
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There is no consensus on earnings smoothness as an indicator of good 
accounting quality. Researchers (for e.g. Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003; 
Lang, Ready, and Yetman, 2003; Ball and Shivkumar, 2005; Lang, Ready, and 
Wilson, 2006; and Barth, Landsman, and Lang, 2008) assume that firms with 
more variable earnings are of good quality accounting. That is, less earnings 
smoothing, more earnings variability, which in turn, leads to better accounting 
quality. The notion behind is that managers artificially reduce earnings 
variability as accounting standards/ regulations provide leeway to do so.
Earnings smoothness can be measured in different ways: 1) the ratio of 
the firm’s standard deviation of operating income scaled by assets, to the 
standard deviation of cash flows from operations scaled by total assets (Leuz et 
al. 2003); 2) the ratio of firm j ’th standard deviation of net income before 
extraordinary items divided by beginning total assets, to its standard deviation 
of cash flows from operations divided by beginning total assets (Francis et al. 
2004).
2.3.6 Earnings variability.
This metric of accounting quality is based on the variability of the 
change in net income scaled by total assets (Lang, Raedy, and Wilson, 2006; 
Barth, Landsman, and Lang 2008). A smaller variance of the change in net 
income is interpreted as evidence of earnings management which in turn is 
evidence of lower accounting quality (Barth, Landsman, and Lang, 2008). 
Earnings variability metric is the variance of the residuals from the regression 
of change in net income on variables identified in prior research as control for
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these factors (Barth, Landsman, and Lang, 2008). Higher earnings variability 
means less earnings smoothing, and better accounting quality. This metric of 
accounting quality is widely used in the accounting literature (Lang, Raedy, 
and Yetman, 2003; Lang, Raedy, and Wilson, 2006; Barth, Landsman, and 
Lang, 2008; Paglietti, 2009).
2.3.7 Value Relevance.
This measure of accounting quality is based on the notion that 
accounting quality numbers should explain the information that is impounded 
in returns. Value relevance metric explains the ability of one or more 
accounting numbers to explain variations in stock returns (Francis, Olsson, and 
Schipper, 2006). Higher the explanatory power of earnings means higher the 
variation in returns which results to higher accounting quality. Researchers 
(such as Lang, Raedy, and Yetman, 2003; Lang, Raedy, and Wilson, 2006; 
Barth, Landsman, and Lang, 2008; Paglietti, 2009) used this metric for their 
empirical investigation. The value relevance metric is typically based on 
explanatory power of regression i.e. adjusted R2. Researchers like Collins et al. 
(1997); Francis and Schipper (1999); and Bushman et al. (2004) run the 
following regression of returns on the level and change in earnings (Francis, 
Olsson, and Schipper, 2006):12
RETjt = S0j  + SijEARNjt + 62jbEARNjx + qjx  (2.6)
RETJ t= firm j  ’th 15 month return ending 3 months after the end of fiscal year t;
12 Researchers use different regressions to compute the explanatory power for this metric. 
Research by Lang, Raedy, and Yetman (2003); Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2006); and Barth, 
Landsman, and Lang (2008) can also be referred for more details.
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EARNj t= firm j ’th income before extraordinary items in year t, scaled by 
market value at end of year t-1; and
&EARNj t= change in firm j ’th income before extraordinary items in year t, 
scaled by market value at end of year t-1;
2.3.8 Earnings in formativeness/ or earnings response coefficient.
Earnings informativeness (or earnings response coefficient) is measured 
as the estimated slope coefficient on the level or change in earnings, or some 
aggregation of the estimated slope coefficients on both the earnings levels and 
change in earnings from expressions like equation (2.6). The dependent 
variable can be a long term measure of annual returns or short term market 
reaction to an event, such as a three-day cumulative abnormal return 
surrounding an earnings announcement. The slope coefficient on earnings 
(level or change) indicates the earnings quality (Teoh and Wong, 1993). Teoh 
and Wang show a positive relation between the credibility of accounting 
information and the coefficients relating returns to earnings. There are many 
factors that intervene with the slope coefficient. Researchers control for these 
other factors in estimating earnings informativeness and posit an intervening 
variable that causes earnings quality variability. For instance, Teoh and Wong 
(1993) posit audit by big eight auditors as an intervening variable and test for 
incrementally positive slope coefficient for firms with better earnings quality 
based on the intervening variable. They found that firms with big 8 auditors 
have better earnings quality and in turn greater earnings informativeness as 
compared to firms with non-big eight auditors.
2.3.9 Earnings opacity.
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Earnings opacity is ‘the extent to which the distribution of reported 
earnings of firms fails to present information about true distribution of 
(unobservable) economic earnings of firms’ (Bhattacharya, Daouk, and 
Welker, 2003). Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker (2003) use earnings 
aggressiveness, loss avoidance, and earnings smoothing as proxies for earnings 
opacity. These proxies as well as earnings opacity itself can be viewed as 
measures of accounting quality (Francis, Olsson, and Schipper, 2006).
Earnings aggressiveness is measured as total accruals scaled by lagged 
total assets. Larger fractions of accruals are being more aggressive and vice 
versa. Loss avoidance is measured as the ratio of the percentage of firms 
reporting small positive earnings (i.e. ratio of net income to total assets 
between 0% and 1%) to the percentage of firms reporting small negative 
earnings (i.e. ratios of net income to total assets between -1% and 0%). The 
higher is this ratio (that is, the more likely are small positive earnings relative 
to small negative earnings), the greater is loss avoidance. Finally earnings 
smoothing is measured as the correlation between accruals and cash flows, 
both scaled by total assets.
2.3.10 Timelines
This measure is quite similar to value relevance. Timeliness captures the 
ability of earnings to reflect good news and bad news that is impounded in 
returns, and is measured as the explanatory power of regression of earnings on 
returns. The use of timeliness as a measure of earnings quality is based on the 
same presumption that supports value relevance as an earnings quality
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measure. The measure of timeliness is adjusted R2 from the under mentioned 
equation (2.7) (Ball et al., 2000 as cited in Francis, Olsson, and Schipper, 
2006). Smaller values of timeliness imply less timely (i.e. lower quality) 
earnings. Equation (2.7) is typically estimated on a firm specific basis in time 
series.
EARNjt = a0j  + a-LjNEGjt + pl t RETjt + p2,j^EGjt RETjt + <;Jt (2.7) 
NEGjit= lif  RETjX< 0 and 0 otherwise.13
2.3.11 Conservatism (or timely loss recognition)
Conservatism is defined as the differential ability of accounting 
earnings to reflect economic losses (measured as negative stock returns) versus 
economic gains (measured as positive stock returns) (Ball et al., 2000). 
Following Basu (1997), Ball et al. (2000) measure conservatism as the ratio of 
the slope coefficients on positive returns in a reverse regression of earnings on 
returns as in equation (2.7) (Francis, Olsson, and Schipper, 2006). Timely loss 
recognition is also another measure same as conservatism. However, it is 
measured by using proxy ‘large negative earnings’. The notion behind this 
metric is that firms who recognize large losses as they occur without deferring 
them to future periods are of higher accounting quality (Lang, Ready, and 
Yetman, 2003; Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003; Lang, Ready, and Wilson, 
2006; Barth, landsman, and Lang, 2008). That is, a higher frequency of large 
losses is assumed as higher quality earnings.
2.3.12 Managing toward Positive Earnings
13 Other variables are defined in equation 2.6.
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The frequency of small positive net income is used as a proxy for this 
metric. The underlying notion for this metric is that managers prefer to report 
small positive net income rather than negative net income (Barth, landsman, 
and Lang, 2008). Firms with the higher frequency of small positive net income 
are assumed as of lower accounting quality and vice versa.
2.3.13 e-loadings
This is return based measure of accounting quality. ‘The e-loading is 
the slope coefficient from a regression of excess returns on a factor mimicking 
portfolio that captures earnings quality (AQfactor), controlling for other factors 
known to effect returns (market risk premium, size, and book-to-market ratio)’. 
The calculation of AQfactor follows the Fama-French procedures for 
calculating factor-mimicking portfolios. Larger e-loading values (slope 
coefficients) imply to poor earnings quality and vice versa. The e-loading is the 
coefficient estimate for AQfactor obtained from the following asset pricing 
regressions (Ecker et al., 2006):14
1 -  factor: Rjx -  RPX = + P}j (Rmx ~ RFlt) + ej^.AQfactort + (2.8)
3 -  factor: Rjx -  RFx = a]fT + p{j(RMX -  RFX) + s//SAfflt -I- h?jHMLt + 
eJ^ -AQ factor,. + ef( (2.9)
These equations can be measured using daily, weekly or monthly returns 
as per research design choice. Ecker et al, (2006) ‘create an accounting-based 
measure of accruals quality AQj X, using a restricted sample of firms with seven
14 The explanation o f exact procedure can be found in paper ‘A Retums-Based Representation 
of Earnings Quality’ by Ecker et al. (2006).
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years of accounting data, convert AQ to a time-specific returns representation 
(AQfactor)' (see, Ecker et al., 2006, p.757).
Assuming use of daily returns, t  = index for a trading day in year T; 
Rj t~ finn j ’s return on day t; RFit= the risk free rate on day t; RMit=the market 
return on the dayt; SMBt= Fama-French small-minus-big factor on day t; 
HMLt= Fama-French high-minus-low book to market factor on day t.
For the 1-factor and 3-factor specification, e jj  and e jj  are the 
estimates of firm’s j ’s sensitivity to poor earnings quality in year T and is 
return based representation of earnings quality. The other slope 
coefficients, /??£ and p f j  as well as s?/ and h.Jj capture the firm’s exposure to 
return-based representations of market risk, size, and book to market value 
respectively in year 1.
2.4 Hypotheses development 
Accounting Quality and Business Cycles
An interesting aspect of research in the area of accounting quality is its 
behavior during different phases of business cycles -  does accounting quality 
improve/ deteriorate during expansion/ contraction period.15 There are a few 
studies which associate accounting quality with economic conditions (for e.g. 
Makar, Alam, and Pearson 1996; Makar and Alam 1998; Johnson, 1999; 
Cohen and Zarowin, 2007; and Jenkins, Kane and Velury, 2009).
15 Business cycles normally include two periods: expansion and contraction. US National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) defines an expansion as a rise in economic activity, 
lasting for years and contraction as a significant decline in economic activity spreads across the 
economy and lasting more than a few months to more than a year, visible in GDP, real income, 
employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales.
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Qinglu (2005) shows managers’ engagement in earnings management 
at different stages of business cycles. This study points that accounting 
information reflects not only firm-specific characteristics, but also general 
macroeconomic conditions; therefore, accounting quality may vary across 
business cycles (Cohen and Zarowin, 2007 and Jenkins, Kane, and Velury, 
2009). Thus, motivations exist to tamper with accounting numbers during these 
economic ups and downs.
Given the fact that business cycles significantly affect the economy, the 
rise or decline in economic activity also affects the ability of firms to manage 
earnings (Johnson, 1999; Cohen and Zarowin, 2007; and Jenkins, Kane and 
Velury, 2009).
In periods of economic expansion, peer pressure to perform well can 
motivate mangers to adjust earnings opportunistically. Also, stock prices react 
more strongly to bad news in good times compared to good news in bad times. 
Supporting this, Conrad, Cornell, and Landsman (2002) and Cohen and 
Zarowin (2007) findings suggest that market penalty for negative unexpected 
earnings is higher in good times and firms manage earnings more in the up 
markets to avoid this higher penalty. Under the aforementioned conditions and 
consistent with Cohen and Zarowin, 2007; and Jenkins, Kane and Velury, 
2009, it is hypothesized that:
HI: Higher/lower accounting quality during contraction/expansion period. 
Earnings Management and Business Cycles
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Cohen and Zarowin, 2007 focus on earnings management as a measure
of accounting quality over business cycles. While earnings management has
been studied extensively, virtually all studies have focused on firm specific
effects. Not only firm specific effects, economic conditions also motivate the
earnings management practice (Cohen and Zarowin, 2007).
There are main two reasons for earnings management during expansion
period. First, bad news in good times has negative stock price impact (Cohen,
Cornell and Landsman, 2002). Investors react more adversely to earnings
disappointments during good times. Second, relative performance evaluation of
managers makes them to manage earnings upward during good times (Cohen
and Zarowin, 2007). Managers will be penalized by the capital markets, if they
fail to meet expectations. Thus, there are incentives to boost earnings in the
expansion period compared to the contraction period.
Based on extant literature on earnings management and business cycles,
researchers state investors confidence is up in up markets and additional good
news does not influence their beliefs (Conrad et al., 2002 and Cohen and
Zarowin, 2007). However, adverse news in up markets definitely affects their
beliefs negatively. Under, abovementioned conditions, it is hypothesized:
H2: More earnings management in the expansion period and less in 
contraction period.
Timely Loss Recognition and Business Cycles
Researchers (for e.g. Johnson, 1999 and Jenkins, Kane and Velury, 
2009) document that the relationship between stock returns and earnings is 
sensitive to business cycles. There may be a possibility of inconsistent
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application of accounting principles during different phases of business cycles 
and financial reporting may be more aggressive during the periods of economic 
growth. Also, managers, auditors, and investors as well are motivated to report 
more ‘conservative earnings’ dining contraction period (Jenkins, Kane and 
Velury, 2009).16 The reasons are mentioned below:
First is the increased litigation risk in the period of economic decline 
(Jenkins, Kane and Velury, 2009). So, reporting conservative numbers is the 
one way to reduce this risk (Watts, 1993 summarized in Jenkins, Kane, and 
Velury, 2009). Quicker availability of bad news (or conservatism) to all parties 
enhances the contracting efficiency and reduces the shareholders litigation 
(Watts, 2003; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Lara et al., 2009; and Jenkins, Kane, 
and Velury, 2009). The second reason is investors demand for conservative 
earnings to get timely signals “for investigating the existence of negative net 
present value projects” (Jenkins, Kane, and Velury, 2009, p. 1042). Normally, 
firms prefer internal sources of funding to external sources, debt over equity 
financing (Myers, 1984). Conversely, they prefer external funding during 
contraction period. Therefore, the third reason is preference for external 
financing and for this purpose, more conservative accounting (or timely loss
16 Traditional definition o f conservatism is “anticipate no profit, but anticipate all losses 
(Bliss, 1924 summarized in Watts, 2003, p. 208). Accounting literature describes two types of 
conservatism: unconditional and conditional. Unconditional conservatism means “the reporting 
of conservative accounting numbers not conditioned on the economic reality”. For e.g. if  an 
asset’s cost is depreciated for five years instead of ten years is likely to lower the current 
earnings. On the other hand, conditional conservatism means to report “the accounting 
numbers conditional on the firm experiencing contemporaneous economic loss” (Jenkins, 
Kane, and Velury, 2009, p. 1044). This definition is unbiased and captures the timely 
recognition o f economic loss. Therefore, the term conservatism refers to conditional 
conservatism (timely loss recognition) that can “enhance contracting efficiency” (Ball and 
Shivkumar, 2005, p. 91).
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recognition) would be demanded during recession “to reduce the information 
costs associated with asymmetric information on the part of managers and new 
outside stakeholders” (Jenkins, Kane, and Velury, 2009). Under the above- 
mentioned conditions and consistent with Jenkins, Kane and Velury (2009), it 
is hypothesized:
H3: Firms recognize more frequently timely large losses in contraction period. 
Accounting Quality and Regulations
One of the two measures to improve accounting quality is the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act (SOX), passed in US on July 30, 2002. This act introduced the 
significant legislative changes in financial practices and corporate governance 
regulations for the further prevention of accounting scandals in US. The SOX 
directs organizations to improve accuracy and reliability of corporate 
disclosure and thus protecting the interests of investors. In particular, SOX 
helps improve corporate governance and deters managers’ opportunistic 
behavior (Hossain et al. 2011). It is also cheaper to comply with SOX than to 
deal with restatements (Linn and Diehl, 2005). Lobo and Zhou (2006) and 
Verleun et al., (2011), also find significant reduction in discretionary accruals 
in the post-SOX period relative to pre-SOX period. The other is the Regulation 
of Fair Disclosure (RFD) passed in 2000. The main aim of RFD was to reduce 
information differences between individual and market participants and also to 
prohibit selective disclosure of material information (Bailey et al. 2003; 
Eleswarapu, Thompson, and Venkataratnan, 2004). Therefore, the impact of 
these regulations cannot be ignored. Therefore, it is hypothesized:
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This chapter discusses the database and methodology used in the study. 
This chapter is divided into two sections. Section 1 discusses the database used 
in the study. Section 2 presents the methodology used in the empirical 
investigation.
3.1 Database
The focus of the present study is non-financial and non-government 
enterprises in the United States. In order to capture the overall picture of 
United States corporate sector, the investigation started with all publicly listed 
companies in the S&P 1500 index in 2010. For these S&P 1500 companies, we 
collected financial and related data for the period 1980-2010. Data was 
collected from database indices DataStream, Capital IQ and National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER). The details of variables collected/ used for this 
study with their sources and notations are described in Appendix tables 3.1 and
3.2.
Data set for this study consists of 677 firms out of total S&P 1500 firms 
from 1993-2010. Our endeavor was to complete balanced panel data set for the 
periods 1993-2010, we were successful to comply with the constant data for 
677 firms for the period 1993-2010. This data set of firms is more than one- 
third (45%) of total S&P 1500 firms after excluding financial institutions (with 
SIC Code 6000-6999). Financial institutions were excluded because of their
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different dynamics in earnings management as opposed to non-financial firms 
(McNichols and Wilson, 1988).
The period from 1993-2010 was chosen for the empirical investigation 
so as to cover pre-REG and post-REG years and to see the impact of these 
regulations on earnings management in addition to the impact of business 
cycles on earnings management.
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 US Business Cycles: Expansions and Contractions
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) does not define a 
recession in terms of two consecutive quarters of decline in real GDP. Rather, a 
recession is defined as “a significant decline in economic activity spread across 
the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, 
real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales” 
(NBER). NBER is a business cycle dating committee and maintains a 
chronology of the US business cycle17. Furthermore, contractions start at the 
peak of a business cycle and end at the trough (NBER). That is, contraction 
period includes all quarters starting from the peak and ending to the trough 
period. As the data for this study is annual, the data of business cycles are 
converted to yearly data using the extension of periods. For the purpose, if any 
one quarter (at least three months) of the year comes under NBER business 
cycle reference dates, that year is considered as a recession year because even
17 The chronology comprises dates o f  peaks and troughs in  economic activity.
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if there is only one quarter of recession, the impact of this recessionary quarter 
cannot be ignored on company’s financial statements.
3.2.2. Selection criterion for contraction years
NBER announces contractions (recessions) dates on a quarterly basis. 
Business cycles reference dates announced from the NBER’s Business Cycle 
Dating Committee are:
Table 3.1: Business Cycles Reference Dates
Peak Trough Contraction Duration
January 1980(1) July 1980(111) 6
July 1981(111) November 1982(IV) 16
July 1990(111) M arch 1991(1) 8
M arch 2001(1) November 2001(IV) 8
December 2007(IV) June 2009(11) 18
♦Note: Quarterly dates are in parentheses. Contraction means peak to trough and the duration 
is in months. Source: NBER18
For the year of 1980, the recession started in the first quarter (January 
1980) and ended in third quarter (July 1980). This period includes six months 
or two quarters. For the year of 1981, it began in third quarter (July 1981) and 
continued till the fourth quarter of this year (December 1981), that is, the 
duration of recession was six month or two quarters. The recession started in 
1981 ended in the fourth quarter of 1982 (November 1982) and it includes near 
about four quarters of this year. Similarly, for the years of 1990 and 1991, 
recession started in July 1990, the third quarter and ended in March 1991, the 
first quarter. The duration of recession was two quarters and one quarter for the
18 Refer www.nber.org/
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years of 1990 and 1991 respectively. Furthermore, the recession began in the 
first quarter of 2001 (March 2001) and ended in the fourth quarter (November 
2001), that is, the contraction period continued for consecutive eight months or 
near about three quarters. After that NBER announced December 2007, the 
fourth quarter as a peak period. As it was the last month of the year, 2007, it 
does not fulfill the criterion of at least of one quarter of recession for this 
particular year, therefore, this year was considered as an expansion year. 
Recession that began in December 2007 continued till June 2009, the second 
quarter. The duration of recession was four quarters and two quarters for the 
years of 2008 and 2009 respectively.
Table 3.2: NBER Annual Business Cycles Classification



















Note: if  any one quarter (at least three months) o f the year comes under NBER business cycle 
reference dates, that year is considered as a recession year because even if there is only one 
quarter of recession, it can affect company’s financial statements. Source: NBER
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3.2.3 Accounting Quality Metrics
In order to test the research hypotheses and coherent with prior 
research, two accounting quality metrics based on accounting data were used: 
earning management, and timely loss recognition (Lang, Raedy, and Yetman, 
2003; Lang, Raedy, and Wilson, 2006; Barth, Landsman, and Lang, 2008; 
Paglietti, 2009).19 
Earnings Management
There are two methods to detect earning management; accruals based 
and earnings based (Verleun et al. 2011). The most widely used models are 
accrual based and discretionary accruals are used as a proxy for earnings 
management. We used both methods to measure earnings management more 
precisely to get profound results.
Five earnings management proxies were used such as: ‘discretionary 
accruals’ [DACC], ‘variance of the change in net income [<r (ANI)], ‘ratio of the 
variance of the change in net income to the variance of the change in cash 
flows [a (ANI)/ a (ACF)], correlation between accruals and cash flows [p 
(ACC, CF)], and ‘frequency of small positive net income’ [SP05]. 20
(a) Discretionary Accruals (DACC)
Discretionary accruals model is often used as a proxy for earnings 
management to analyze and identify earnings management practice (Dechow, 
Sloan, and Sweeny, 1995; Kothari, Leone, and Wasley, 2005) as managers use
19 Results related to ‘timely loss recognition’ metric and other proxies for earnings 
management in addition to discretionary accruals are reported in appendix tables 4.1 and 4.2.
20 Earnings management proxies such as a (ANI), a (ANI)/ a (ACF), p  (ACC, CF), and 
SPOS are best described in Barth, Landsman, and Lang, 2008)
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their discretion on these accruals. The equation regressed to observe the impact
of determinants of discretionary accruals was of the following form:
DACCit = p0 + fcSIZEu + p2ROAlt + p2LEVit + p4BCit + f}sREGit + E i t  (3.1)
Where, /?x < 0,/?2 > 0,/?3 > 0,/?4 >  0, and /?5 <  0
Where for the firm i and year t,
SIZE = log of end of the year assets;
ROA = return on assets;
LEV = total liabilities divided by total assets;
BC = dummy variable, 1 for expansion period and 0 for contraction period; and 
REG = Dummy variable, I for RFD or SOX and 0 otherwise.21
As per extant literature, Modified Jones model is widely used to 
measure discretionary accruals (Subramanyam, 1996; Rangan, 1998; Teoh, 
Wong, and Rao, 1998). The main property of standard Jones model (1991) and 
Modified Jones model (1995) is that they decompose the total accruals in to 
discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. These models relax the 
assumption of previous models (such as Healy and DeAngelo) that non- 
discretionary accruals are constant and mitigate the misspecification of total 
accruals as discretionary accruals. Modified Jones model overcomes the 
limitation of standard Jones model (1991) that assumes that revenues are non- 
discretionary. Also major accounting scandals (for e.g. Enron and WorldCom) 
disprove this assumption as revenues were inflated to show the companies’ 
financial health. Modified Jones model captures the sales/revenue based 
earnings manipulation and takes into account that all credit sales in the event 
period result from earnings management. Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) 
criticize the Modified Jones model as revenues are not always the case for
21 RFD denotes to the Regulation of Fair Disclosure passed in 2000. SOX denotes to the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act passed in 2002.
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accruals manipulation and augment the model with addition of the variable, 
return on assets (ROA) for period’s t and t+1. Also the Modified Jones model 
suffers from severe misspecification in stratified random samples. However, 
they also admit that their model does have its own misspecification problems. 
Furthermore, among the five models such as Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986), 
Jones (1991), Modified Jones (1995), and Industry model (1991), Dechow, 
Sloan, and Sweeny (1995) found that the Modified Jones model exhibits the 
most power in detecting earnings management. Therefore, this model was used 
to measure discretionary accmals. For the measurement of discretionary 
accruals, total accruals {TACC) and non-discretionary accruals are required. 
Total accmals were calculated using the following model (Dechow et al. 1995).
Where for the firm i and year t,
TACC = Total accruals,
AC A = change in current assets
ACL = change in current liabilities
ACash = change in cash and cash equivalents
ASTD = change in debt included in current liabilities
Dep = depreciation and amortization expense
A = Total Assets
Total accruals consist of both discretionary accmals and 
nondiscretionary accruals. That is, the equation (3.3) was used:
TACCit ACAit-ACLit -&Cashit+&STDu-DepitAtt-i (3.2)
TACCit =  DACCit + N DACCu (3.3)
Where for the firm i and year /, 
DACC = discretionary accruals and, 
NDACC = nondiscretionary accmals
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Modified Jones model works to measure nondiscretionary accruals. 
Modified Jones model calculates the nondiscretionary accruals using equation 
(3.4).
NDACCit = ax - 2 -  + a2(AREVit -  ARECit) + a3PPEit (3.4)
" I t - 1
Where for the firm i and year t,
AREV = change in revenues scaled by total assets;
AREC= change in net receivables scaled by total assets;
PPE = gross property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets; and 
al ta2, and a3 = firm specific parameters.
Estimates of the firm specific parameters, ai ja2,anda3 are generated
using the equation (3.5) in the estimation period. Thus, the model is:
TACCit = ai~7~— + o.'iPPEit + £u (3.5)
^ i t - i
al t  a2, a n d a 3 denote the OLS estimates of a x, a 2, and a3. The 
estimates of a2> and a3 are those obtained from the original Jones Model. The 
only adjustment relative to the original model Jones Model is that the change in 
revenues is adjusted for the change in receivables in the event period to 
determine non-discretionary accruals.
After the total accruals and nondiscretionary accruals calculated, the 
final step was to measure discretionary accruals using equation (3.6):
DACCn = TACCU ~  NDACC^ (3.6)
The study adopts a dynamic-panel estimation framework as it captures 
dynamics of business cycles, the Regulation of Fair Disclosure and the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act on discretionary accruals. In term of empirical 
methodology frameworks, we present estimates based on panel least square, 
fixed effects model, random effects model, and generalized method of
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moments (GMM). The GMM is the robust estimator and does not require 
about the exact distribution of the data generating process. The GMM 
empirical work is presented in two varieties: differenced-GMM from Arellano 
and Bond (1991) and system-GMM estimator from Blundell and Bond (1998, 
2000). The differenced-GMM derives the coefficients from moment 
restrictions on the co-variances between the regressors and the error term. The 
differenced-GMM controls for endogeneity but the estimate is subject to a 
large downward finite sample bias particularly when the number of time series 
observations is small, as lagged level of variables are only weak instruments 
for subsequent differences. The system-GMM estimator uses in addition to 
lagged levels, also lagged first differences as instruments for equations in 
levels. By adding the original equation in levels, Blundell and Bond (1998, 
2000) argued that the system-GMM estimator performs good predictors for the 
endogenous variables in the model even when the series is very persistent.
(b) Variance of the Change in Net Income: a (A NI)
Another metric of accounting quality is based on the variability of the 
change in net income scaled by total assets (Lang, Raedy, and Wilson, 2006; 
Barth, Landsman, and Lang 2008). A smaller variance of the change in net 
income is interpreted as evidence of earnings management which in turn is 
evidence of lower accounting quality (Barth, Landsman, and Lang, 2008). 
Earnings variability metric is the variance of the residuals from the regression 
of change in net income on variables identified in prior research as control for 
these factors (Barth, Landsman, and Lang, 2008).
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ANIit = p0 + PiSIZEu +  prGROWTHit +  p3EISSUEit +  /?4 L£Vlt + 
p5DISSUEit + p6TURNit + p7 CFit + ps AUDit +  eit (3.7)
Where, for the firm i and year t:
NI = earnings before interest and taxes;
SIZE = the natural logarithm of the end of year assets;
GROWTH = percentage change in sales/revenues;
EISSUE = percentage change in equity;
LEV = end of year total liabilities divided by end of year equity book value;
DISSUE = percentage change in total liabilities;
TURN = sales divided by end of year total assets;
CF -  annual net cash flow from operating activities divided by end of year total 
assets;
AUD = an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is PwC,
KPMG, E&Y, and D&T, and zero otherwise.
Relevant observations were pooled to estimate equation (3.7) for the
comparison between expansion and contraction periods. For the comparison,
the o(ANI) is the variance of the residuals from equation (3.7). Equation (3.7)
helps compute the difference in the a (ANI) between expansion and contraction
period.
(c) The ratio of the variance of the change in net income to the ratio of the
variance of the change in cash flows: a (ANI)/a (ACF)
This metric is based on the ratio of the variance of the change in net
income, a (A NI), to the variance of the change in operating cash flows, a
(ACF). Volatile cash flows typically lead to more volatile net income, and the
use of accruals should result to lesser a (A NI) than a (ACF) (Barth, Landsman,
and Lang, 2008). Also, ANI and ACF is likely to be sensitive to a variety of
factors un-attributable to the financial reporting system. Thus, equation (9) is
similar as equation (8) with ACF as the dependent variable:
ACFit = pQ + PiSIZEu + pxGROWTHit + p3EISSUElt +  p4 LEVit + 
p5DISSUEit + p6TURNit + p7 CFit + ps AUDit + eit (3.8)
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As similar to equation (3.7), relevant observations were pooled for the 
particular comparison. The a ACF is the variance of group of residuals from 
equation (3.8). This metric of earnings management tests the difference of the 
variance ratio, {a A NI) /  a (ACF) between expansion and contraction period.
(d) Correlation between Accruals and Cash Flows: p (ACC, CF)
This metric shows the spearman correlation between accruals and cash
flows, p (ACC, CF). This metric compares correlation of residuals from
equations (3.9) and (3.10), rather than direct correlation between AC and CF.
Accruals (ACC) are calculated using equation (3.2) (Dechow et al., 1995). Both
ACC and CF are regressed on the control variables excluding CF:
ACCit = /?„ + ptSIZEit + PxGROWTHit + (]3EISSUEit + /?4 LEVit + 
psDISSUEit + P6TURNit + p7 AUDit + eit (3.9)
CFit = p0 + PiSIZElt + p2GR0WTHit + p3EISSUEit + p4 LEVit + 
PsDISSUEit + P6TURNit + p7 AUDit + eit (3.10)
This metric compares the p (ACC, CF) between expansion and
contraction period. Less negative correlation between ACC and CF means less
earnings management or higher accounting quality.
(e) Small Positive Net Income (SPOS)
This metric for managing towards positive earnings is the coefficient 
on small positive net income, SPOS, in the regressions given by equation 
(3.11). SPOS is an indicator variable that equals one if net income scaled by 
total assets is between 0 and 0.01 (Lang, Raedy, and Yetman, 2003; Barth,
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Landsman, and Lang, 2008). Equation (3.11) estimates SPOS of firms in the
•  22expansion and contraction periods by pooling observations for all periods.
BC{ 0, l ) it = p 0 + PiSPOSit + pzSlZElt +  p3GROWTHit + p4ElSSUEit + 
PsLEVit + p6DISSUEit + p7TURNit + p8 CFit + pB AUDit +  eit (3.11)
BC (0, 1) is also an indicator variable that equals one for observations in
the expansion period and zero otherwise. A positive coefficient on SPOS
indicates that firms manage earnings toward small positive amounts more
frequently in the expansion period than they do in the contraction period.
Timely Loss Recognition
The proxy used for timely loss recognition, a characteristic of
accounting quality is large negative net income (LNEG).23 This is one of test
variable in the regression equation (3.12). LNEG is an indicator variable that
equals one for observations for which annual net income scaled by total assets
is less than -0.20, and zero other-wise (Barth, Landsman, and Lang, 2008). For
the comparison of firms in the expansion and contraction periods, observations
were pooled for all periods to estimate equation (3.12).
BC(0, l ) £t = p0 + piLNEGa + p2SIZEit + p3GROWTHit +  p4EISSUEit + 
p5LEVit + p6DlSSUEit + p7TURNit + p8 CFit + P8AUDit + £it (3.12)
A negative coefficient on LNEG indicates that firms recognize large 
losses more frequently in the contraction period as compare to expansion 
period.
22 Following Lang, Ready, and Wilson (2006); and Barth, Landsman, and Lang, (2008), in 
the analysis o f SPOS and LNEG, results are reported from ordinary least squares rather than 
from logit/probit estimation because Green (1993) reports that logit models are extremely 
sensitive to the effects of hctroscedascity.





This chapter presents empirical results of accounting quality of US 
firms during 1993-2010. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first 
section presents the results of overall trends in earnings management. The 
second section presents the results of proximate determinants of earnings 
management. The third section summarizes the results.
4.1 Overall trends in Earnings Management
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for the period 1993-2010
This table presents the variables for the analysis of measuring earnings management through 
discretionary accruals (calculated by Modified Jones Model) of 677 publicly listed US 
companies from 1993-2010. The variable SIZE is the log o f total assets. ROA is return on 
assets; LEV is leverage (Total Liabilities/Total Assets); BC states the state o f economy 
whether its expansion or contraction; REG is for the regulations: the Regulation of Fair 
Disclosure passed (2000) and the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002).
DACC SIZE ROA LEV BC REG
Mean 0.008 6.293 0.100 0.530 0.778 0.611
Median -0.018 6.265 0.097 0.543 1.000 1.000
Maximum 2.692 8.902 4.875 3.041 1.000 1.000
Minimum -4.760 3.556 -2.663 -0.115 0.000 0.000
Skewness 2.508 0.112 3.298 0.736 -1.336 -0.456
Kurtosis 78.638 2.912 266.764 9.214 2.786 1.208
Std. Dev. 0.175 0.733 0.119 0.209 0.416 0.488
Observations(n) 12186 12186 12186 12186 12186 12186
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Table 4.1 reports the basic descriptive statistics of data used in the 
empirical investigation. The average logsize of the total assets of US 
companies for the period 1993-2010 is 6.293. The assets logsize of the smallest 
firm was 3.556 and the largest firm had an assets logsize of 8.902. Given the 
part that average logsize of companies far exceeds that of median (6.265) 
implies that these are large companies in the cohort of companies in the 
empirical investigation. The average of discretionary accruals was 0.8%, with 
the highest discretionary accruals percentage being 269.2% and the lowest 
being -476%. The mean of return on assets was 10%. The maximum and 
lowest returns on assets were 487.5% and -266.3% respectively which implies 
wide dispersion in performance. The average leverage ratio was 53%, with the 
highest leveraged firm having a ratio of 304.1% and the lowest was -11.5%. 
The economy of United States was in a state of expansion for 78% of the 
period of study (1993-2010).
Table 4.2: Changes in Discretionary Accruals during pre-REG and post- 
REG period
This table presents the behavior o f discretionary accruals (calculated by Modified Jones 
Model) of 677 publicly listed companies for pre-REG period (1993-1999), post-REG period 
(2000-2010), and for the whole period of empirical investigation (1993-2010).
Panel a P
1993-1999 -1.546*** 0.030***





Note: Figures in 0  are t-statistics.
***, **, * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively (two-sided test).
40
Table 4.2 reports the time behavior of discretionary accruals during 
different panels. During 1993-2010, discretionary accruals have dropped by 
0.3% per year. Beta (fl) indicates that overall accounting quality has improved 
during this period in US. Pre-REG (1993-1999) period shows increase in 
discretionary accmals. Discretionary accruals increased by 3% for each 
additional year. In the post-REG period (2000-2010), results show the decrease 
in discretionary accruals. Discretionary accmals decreased by 2.1% per 
additional year. The post-REG period shows that accounting quality has 
improved after the passage of regulations. In the following sections, we 
examine the proximate determinants of discretionary accmals.
4.2 Empirical Results- Behavioral Regressions
Table 4.3 (see page 44) presents estimates based on equation 3.1 (in 
Chapter 3) based on panel least squares, fixed effects, and random effects 
models. The results are consistent across panel data estimation techniques and 
have the hypothesized signs and statistically significant except for the LogSize 
variable (in the panel and fixed/random effects model). The estimates of panel 
and random effects models are broadly similar. The Hausman Test (x2 statistic) 
is zero, so null hypothesis cannot be rejected that our preferred model is 
random effects. The results of this model are consistent with our hypotheses. 
The firm size is positively correlated with earnings management that is 
contrary to our hypothesis but; it is also statistically insignificant. Other 
variables such as BC, ROA, and LEV have same signs as predicted and also 
are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, level respectively. These
results confirm our hypotheses that business cycles, firm’s performance 
(returns on assets), and leverage are positively associated with earnings 
management. The results presented in the table 4.2 are inconsistent for the 
variable regulations (REG) as we hypothesized that it negatively correlates 
with the earnings management but this variable is highly statistically 
significant. The main limitation of panel, fixed, and random effects estimation 
procedure is the correlation of independent variable with the error term [(y/x 
+e) cov x & e ^  0]. This makes these estimation procedures less reliable and 
not robust (Stock and Watson, 2011). Hence, we turn to more robust estimation 
techniques like Arellano-Bond generalized methods of moments (GMM) and 
system GMM and the results are presented in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4 (see page 45) reports the estimates based on Arellano-Bond 
generalized method of moments (GMM) and system GMM. The estimates for 
the system GMM are reasonable (more robust) and expected signs are as 
hypothesized for the exogenous variables BC and REG. The main hypotheses, 
business cycles (BC) and regulations (REG) are statistically and highly 
significant at 1% level with hypothesized signs. In the system GMM estimates 
which is our preferred model, all variables signs are same as hypothesized 
except for assets size. These results clearly show business cycles have positive 
impact on discretionary accruals (Tables 4.3 and 4.4). The variable REG is 
negatively correlated with earnings management as hypothesized (table 4.4). 
That is, the passage of regulations dampened discretionary accruals based 
earnings management.
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4.3 Summary of results
The empirical results show that earnings management as captured by 
discretionary accruals has decreased by 0.3% per year during 1993-2010 in US. 
Prior to regulations, earnings management increased, but, subsequent to 
regulations it has shown a marked decline.
We had presented empirical results on the based on panel least square, 
fixed effects, and random effects model, Arellano-Bond GMM, and System 
GMM for discretionary accruals based earnings management. The major 
limitation of pooled/ least square model is that it suffers from correlation on 
independent variables with error term and also does not model heterogeneity of 
firms in panel. Fixed effects and random effects models recognize 
heterogeneity but suffer from omitted variable bias and low explanatory power. 
On the basis of Hausman test, random effects model was selected. The results 
by random effects model showed positive relation between earnings 
management and business cycles as predicted. These results reflected more 
earnings management/ lower accounting quality during expansion period; 
however these results were not consistent with other exogenous variable REG. 
This variable was statistically significant but coefficient sign was inconsistent 
as hypothesized. To test the validity of results, more robust estimators: 
Arellano-Bond GMM and system GMM used to run panel regressions. System 
GMM results provide the same signs for the most crucial variables BC and 
REG as predicted with highly statistically significant level at 1%.
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Table 4.3: Determinants of Discretionary Accruals of US firms based on Modified Jones Model -1993-2010
The dependent variable is DACC (discretionary accruals). ROA is return on assets (EBIT/Total Assets); LEV is leverage (Total 
Liabilities/Total Assets). BC (Business Cycle) is a dummy variable with a value of one for expansion period and zero otherwise; REG is 
also a dummy variable with a value of one for post-REG period and zero, otherwise.
Hypothesized
Sign
Panel Least Squares Fixed Effects Random Effects
Constant +/- -0.128(0.014)*** -0.280(0.043)*** -0.128(0.014)***
LogSize (-) 0.003(0.002) 0.029(0.007)*** 0.003(0.002)
ROA + 0.034(0.013)*** 0.072(0.016)*** 0.034(0.013)***
LEV + 0.014(0.008)* 0.003(0.013) 0.014(0.008)*
BC + 0.084(0.004)*** 0.085(0.004)*** 0.084(0.004)***
REG (-) 0.063(0.004)*** 0.054(0.004)*** 0.063(0.004)***
Observations(n) 12186 12186 12186
R2 0.043 0.099 0.043
Jarque-Bera 
(Normality test of 
residuals) 




Note: Figures in () are standard errors.
***> **, * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively (two-sided test).
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Table 4.4: Determinants of DACC of S&P 1500 (US) firms -1993-2010
The dependent variable is DACC (discretionary accruals). ROA is return on assets (EBIT/Total Assets); LEV is leverage (total 
liabilities/total assets). BC (business cycle) is a dummy variable with a value of one for expansion period and otherwise zero; REG is also a 
dummy variable with a value of one for post-REG period and otherwise zero.
Expected Sign GMM System GMM
CONSTANT +/- -.606(.155)*** .083(.108)
BC + .021 (.006)*** .013(.005)***
REG (-) -.037(.005)*** -.020(.006)***
LOGSIZE (-) .008(.055) .005(.056)
ROA + -.023(.050) .017(.041)
LEV + .025(.058) .033(.055)
Observations(n) 9478 10155
Number of groups(N) 677 677
AR(2) -2.881 -2.429
(test of serial correlation 
No. of lags of endogenous 
variables used in instrumentations 3 3
Note: Figures in () are standard errors.




The main purpose of this study was to test accounting quality during 
booms and bust phases of business cycles for US firms. Based on a comparable 
data set of 677 companies for the period 1993-2010, we examined the impact 
of business cycles and financial regulation on accounting quality of US firms
One of the controversial areas is whether the accounting quality has 
improved or not over the years. Accounting quality is antonym with 
discretionary accruals. If discretionary accruals which are a proxy for earnings 
management are decreasing, then one can conclude that accounting quality is 
increasing. The study showed that there is an overall decrease in discretionary 
accruals during the period (1993-2010) of empirical investigation, however, 
discretionary accmals increased before the passage of stricter financial 
regulations (like RFD and SOX), but decreased after the passage of these 
regulations.
This study contributes to accounting literature in two ways. First we 
tested accounting quality using widely used measure of accounting quality 
using discretionary accruals and found that business cycles affect firms’ 
accounting quality. This new motivation for earnings management can impact 
the firm’s accounting quality. Furthermore, our findings indicated more 
earnings management and poor accounting quality during expansion period of
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business cycles and less earnings management and better accounting quality 
during downward phase of business cycle. There are strong motivations to 
engage in earnings management practice during expansion period. One is ‘peer 
pressure’ to perform well in economic upturn as whole economy is going up. 
Second is the ‘market penalty’ (for negative unexpected returns) is more in 
good times. Also bad news in good times affects stock prices more than good 
news in bad times. Our results also confirmed that motivations for earnings 
management are not only endogenous (firm specific) but they are also 
exogenous.
Second, this study also tested the impact of stricter and enhanced 
regulations (like RFD and SOX) on accounting quality and found that there is 
positive impact of regulations on accounting quality (earnings management). 
Most of the previous literature showed no impact of these regulations on 
earnings management or accounting quality. But the SOX was passed to 
improve internal controls of firms and non-compliance of the SOX raised 
severe penalties such as loss of exchange listing along with multi-million fines 
and imprisonment of CEO/CFO up to 10 to 20 years. Therefore, there are valid 
reasons to correlate earnings management and regulations negatively.
One of the major contributions of this study is more robust 
econometrics technique like system GMM to test our hypotheses. This 
approach provides efficient inferences assuming a minimal set of statistical 
assumptions. We believe that we are the first to use this model in accounting 
research area and hope that this will help researchers to estimate the more
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robust results for their models. Our results by using more robust econometrics’ 
tool, system GMM show that earnings management reduced after the passage 
of these regulations that is accounting quality increased after 2000.
Overall, this study provides new insights to financial regulators, 
analysts, investors as well as researchers that economic conditions (business 
cycles) also provide genuine grounds to engage in earnings management 
practice which in turn reduce the accounting/earnings quality of firms. 
Moreover, this study confirms that accounting quality has improved after the 
passage of financial regulations.
In addition to earnings management as an accounting quality metric, we 
also applied other metrics of accounting quality such as earnings variability; 
correlation of accmals and cash flows, small positive income, large negative 
income existed in accounting quality literature to test the accounting quality. 
These other measures do not have solid theoretical background and also 
provide mixed results (see appendix table 4.1 and 4.2). Therefore, our 
inferences are mainly based on widely used and validated model Modified 
Jones Model for discretionary accmals and more robust technique system 
GMM for regression run.
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Appendices
Appendix Table 3.1: Description of variables collected for the study with 
their source
Variable Name Description (Definition) Source
EBIT Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) 
represent the earnings of a company before 
interest expense and income tax expense.
DataStream
Total Assets Total Assets represents the sum of total 
current assets, long term receivables, 
investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, 
other investments, net property plant and 




Revenues or Net Sales represent gross sales 





Total Liabilities represents all short and long 
term obligations expected to be satisfied by 
the company.
DataStream
Cash Flow Net Cash Flow — Operating Activities 
represents the net cash receipts and 
disbursements resulting from operations of the 
company. It is the sum of Fund from 
Operations, Funds from/Used for Other 
Operating Activities and Extraordinary Items. 
Data for this field is generally not available 
prior to 1989.
DataStream
Current Assets Current Assets represent cash and other assets 
that are reasonably expected to be realized in 





Current Liabilities represent debt or other 
obligations that the company expects to 
satisfy within one year.
DataStream
Cash or Cash 
Equivalents
Cash represents money available for use in the 
normal operations of the company. It is the 





Short Term Debt represents that portion debt 
payable within one year including current 
portion of long term debt and sinking hind 
requirements of preferred stock or debentures.
DataStream
Depreciation Depreciation represents the process of 
allocating the cost of depreciable asset to the 
accounting periods covered during it expected 
useful life to a business it is non-cash charge 




Property, plant and equipment — net represents 
Gross Property, Plant and Equipment less 
accumulated reserves for depreciation, 
depletions and amortization.
DataStream
Receivables Receivable -  net represents the amounts due 
to the company resulting from the sale of 
goods and services on credit to customers 
(after applicable reserves). These assets 
should reasonably be expected to collect 
within a year or within the normal operating 
cycle of a business.
DataStream





Expansion and contraction periods NBER
Table: 3.2 Description of Variables used in the Study
Notation Definition Description
SIZE Total assets Log of end of the year total assets
ROA Return on 
assets
Earnings before interests and taxes 
divided by total assets of the firm
LEV Leverage Debt to total assets ratio of the firm
BC Business
Cycles
Dummy variable 1 with the value of 1 for 
the expansion period and 0 otherwise
RFD and Regulation of Dummy variable 2 with the value of 1 if
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SOX Fair Disclosure 
and Sarbanes 
Oxley Act




Discretionary accruals values as 




Non-discretionary accruals values as 
determined using Modified Jones model
TACC Total accruals Total accruals values calculated as 
determined using Modified Jones Model
ACA Current assets Current assets in the year t less currents 




Current liabilities in the year t less 
currents liabilities in the year t-1 scaled by 
total assets at t-1
ACash Cash Cash in the year t less cash in the year t- 
1 scaled by total assets at t-1
ASTD Short term 
debt
Short term debt in the year t less short 
term debt in the year t-1 scaled by total 
assets at t-1
Dep Depreciation Depreciation of year t scaled by total 
assets at t-1
A Total assets End of the year total assets
AREV Revenues/Net
sales
Revenues in the year t less revenues in 
the year t-1 scaled by total assets at t-1
PPE Property, plant 
and equipment
Property, plant and equipment in the year 
t scaled by total assets at t-1
AREC Net receivables Net receivables in the year t less net 
receivables in the year t-1 scaled by total 
assets att-1
ANI Net Income Net income in the year t less net income 
in the year t-1 scaled by total assets at t-1
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GROWTH Percentage Revenues in the year t less revenues in
change in net the year t-1 scaled by revenues at t-





Equity in the year t less equity in the year 










Total liabilities in the year t less total 
liabilities in the year t-1 scaled by total 
liabilities at t-1 multiplied by 100.
Revenues in the year t divided by total 
assets in the year t
Annual net cash flows from operating 
activities in the year t divided by end of 
the year total assets at t
AUD Auditor Dummy variable 3 with the value of 1 if 






Cash flow in the year t less cash flow in 
the year t-1 scaled by total assets at t
Total accruals values calculated using 
Modified Jones model
SPOS Small positive 
net income
Dummy variable 4 with the value of 1 if 
net income scaled by total assets is 
between 0 and 0.01 and 0, otherwise
LNEG Large negative 
net income
Dummy variable 5 with the value of 1 if 
net income scaled by total assets is less 
than -0.20 and 0, otherwise___________
Note* Big four auditors are PwC, KPMG, E&Y, and D&T.
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Appendix Table 4.1: Comparison of accounting quality during pre-REG and post-REG period (1993-2010)
ANI is change in annual earnings before interest and taxes scaled by end of the year total assets; CF is annual net cash flow from operating 
activities divided by end of year total assets; ACC is total accruals calculated by using modified Jones model; SPOS is an indicator variable 
that equals one if net income scaled by total assets is between 0 and 0.01; LNEG is an indicator variable that equals one for observations for 







Variability of A NI Post > Pre 0.07 0.14***
Variability of ANIover ACF Post > Pre 1.17 2.33***
Correlation of ACC and CF 
Small Positive NI (SPOS) 
Timely Loss Recognition





Large Negative NI (LNEG) + 0.18***
Note: Tests to compare a A NI (F-test), a A NI over A CF (F-test), p (ACC, CF) (Z test of the difference between two 
independent correlations) have been performed to assess the statistically significance of difference.
***, **, * indicates statistical significance of the difference between expansion and contraction period at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% respectively (two-sided test).
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Appendix Table 4.2: Comparison of accounting quality during Expansion and Contraction period (1993- 
2010)
AN I is change in annual earnings before interest and taxes scaled by end of the year total assets; CF is annual net cash flow from operating 
activities divided by end of year total assets; ACC is total accruals calculated by using modified Jones model; SPOS is an indicator variable 
that equals one if net income scaled by total assets is between 0 and 0.01; LNEG is an indicator variable that equals one for observations for 







Variability of A NI Exp < Con 0.12 0.14***
Variability of ANIover ACF Exp < Con 2.40 2.33***
Correlation of ACC and CF 







Large Negative NI (LNEG) (-) -0.28***
Note: Tests to compare a A NI (F-test), a  A NI over A CF (F-test), p (ACC, CF) (Z test of the difference between 
two independent correlations) have been performed to assess the statistically significance of difference.
***, **, * indicates statistical significance of the difference between expansion and contraction period at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% respectively (two-sided test).
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